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Searching for Representation
Romanian Parliamentary Elites and their Political Roles
ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU
The first years of transition coincided with the reinvention of democratic 
institutional frameworks and the consecration of new political elites. However, the 
redefined institutions were mainly by-products of elites choices and personal interests1, 
and were of consequence unable to tame the unreliable or discretionary actions of 
political leaders’2. The fluid regulatory frameworks and the continuous and sometimes 
contradictory reforms almost invariably favored a flourishing web of rent-seeking 
practices. Elite networks directly coordinating a politics of discretion mainly dominated 
the state building process3. In the Romanian case, the defective political culture, 
described by the continuous search for an active and efficient government, impaired 
the expression of public demands for viable forms of delegation and accountability4. 
The synchronous definition of institutions, the emergent practices of power and the 
citizens’ inability to sanction the decision-makers lead to the creation of an ”atrophic” 
parliamentary institution. The low levels of confidence and the Parliaments’ systematic 
inability to manage societal and political conflicts5 delayed any attempts to hold an 
open debate on the Romanian legislature’s roles and functions. Who are the main actors 
on the parliamentary arena shaping the meanings of political representation? Notably: What 
are the main parliamentary roles and how are they performed within the Romanian political 
system?6. These fundamental interrogations in the comprehension of the Romanian 
democracy (defining the nature and the quality of political representation) are to 
be grasped through an exploratory inquiry into the post-communist institutional 
arrangements and the elites’ perceptions of their own mandates. 
1 Antoni Z. KAMINSKI, Joanna KURCZEWSKA, ”Strategies of Post-Communist 
Transfor mations: Élites as Institution-Builders”, in Bruno GRANCELLI (ed.) Social Change and 
Modernization: Lessons from Eastern Europe, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1995, pp. 131-52.
2 Anton STEEN, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist 
Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Ashgate, Aldershot, Bookfield USA, 
Singapore, Sidney, 1997, p. 2.
3 Ibidem, p. 335 See also Ingrid van BIEZEN, Political Parties in New Democracies: Party 
Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2003; IDEM, 
”Political Parties as Public Utilities”, Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 6, 2004, pp. 701-722; Alexandra 
IONESCU, ”Partis, régime politique et bureaucratie d’État dans le postcommunisme roumain”, 
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 921-943; Petr KOPECKY, 
”Political Parties and the State in Post-Communist Europe: The Nature of Symbiosis”, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 22, no. 3, September 2006, pp. 251-273.
4 Daniel BARBU, Politica pentru barbari, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 7.
5 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2008, p. 36.
6 For an alternative approach on political representation see: Alexandra IONESCU, Du 
Parti-État à l’État des partis. Changer de régime politique en Roumanie, Ed. Academiei Române, 
Bucureşti, 2009, pp. 235-236.
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An endemic feature of nowadays societies, the rapid decline of confidence in the 
Parliamentary institution (interpreted as a sign of defective political representation)1 
can partially be explained by formal and procedural deficiencies. Resulting from 
insufficient or blurred institutional arrangements, momentary self-interested types 
of behavior or even from a parochial referential in the state building process, the 
Parliaments’ unrepresentative conduct is far from being a Romanian exception2. 
However, as Pitkin noted, only these regulatory frameworks cannot account for the 
variations encountered in the definition of the political representation:
”No institutional system can guarantee the essence, the substance of 
representation. Nor should we be too optimistic about the capacity of institutions 
to produce the desired conduct; even the best representative institutions cannot be 
expected to produce representation magically, mechanically, without or event in 
spite of the beliefs, attitudes and intentions of the people operating the system”3.
Conversely, the anemic articulation of ”political representation” can also be 
resulting from the elites’ inability to understand or to fulfill their mandates. Plural 
elites, directly legitimized by their voters, the MPs are continuously involved in a 
general process of bargaining4 for the significance ascribed to different political 
processes. The manner in which these directly elected representatives are imagining 
their (sometimes contradictory) roles in various political contexts (in relations to the 
constituency, political party, plenary sessions activities etc.), the diversity of their 
actions on the parliamentary arena as well as the constraints imposed upon them 
by the institutional arrangements are determining a composite portrait of political 
representation5 in nowadays Romania. 
1 Mattei DOGAN, ”Erosion of Confidence in Thirty European Democracies”, in IDEM (ed.), 
Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2005, pp. 13, 18-19.
2 For the increasing role of the executives when compared to Parliaments in the East Central 
Europe see Petr KOPECKY, ”Power to the Executive! The Changing Executive-Legislative 
Relations in Eastern Europe”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 10, no. 2/3, 2004, pp. 142-153.
3 Hanna PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London, 1972, p. 239.
4 See Pierre BIRNBAUM, ”Introduction”, in Robert DAHL, Qui gouverne?, Armand Colin, 
Paris, 1971, p. XII, and Robert DAHL, ”A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model”, American Political 
Science Review, vol. 52, 1958, pp. 463-469.
5 For similar approaches see: Michael EDINGER, Lars VOGEL, ”Role Perceptions, Party 
Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German Parliamentarians Findings from 
the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003-4)”, Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, vol. 41, 
no. 3, 2005, pp. 375-399; Mattei DOGAN, ”Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys In France, Britain, 
and the United States”, Comparative Sociology, vol. 6, no. 4, 2007, pp. 430-463; Olivier COSTA, 
Eric KERROUCHE, Qui sont les députés français? Enquête sur des élites inconnues, Presses de 
Sciences Po, Paris, 2007; Richard KATZ, Bernhard WESSELS (eds.), The European Parliament, the 
National Parliaments, and European Integration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; Michael 
EDINGER, Jahr STEFAN, Political Careers in Europe: Career Patterns in Multi-level Systems, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2010.
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Political Representation:
Canonical Meanings in Post-communist Romania 
Continuously adapting to internal and external constraints, parliamentary 
representation constitutes one of the main pillars of consolidated democracies. Despite 
the ongoing decline of traditional parliamentary functions and the increasing role played 
by the executive or other regulatory bodies1, the Parliament still remains the main locus 
for political deliberation, legitimizing the political regime2. Primarily transformed by 
the liberalization of political systems and the evolutions in the electorates3, political 
representation continued its unceasing process of metamorphosis. The crystallization 
of the institutional frameworks and practices shifted the emphasis from institutions 
towards individual actors. Subjected to numerous scholarly interrogations, the 
MPs recently emerged as the main guardians and the sole depositories of ”political 
representation”. However, the political aggregation of the MPs’ individual experiences 
is deeply entrenched in the national political contexts4. The internalization of different 
political roles remains strongly determined by the coherence and the functionality of 
mechanisms regarding the MPs’ standing and responsiveness5 (formalistic representation). 
Consequently, the history of representation (and of its unsteady patterns) partially set 
up the political arena in which the contemporary MPs are gradually negotiating (and 
framing) new meanings for their mandates. 
In the Romanian case, the historical articulation of the legislative power followed 
a sinuous path. During the interwar period, the Romanian Parliaments were rather 
characterized by their inability to ensure the regime’s representative dimension. 
Following a mimetic model of democracy6, the Parliaments were in fact by-products of 
the governmental functioning7. The electoral system manufactured majorities (as the 
elections were organized by the newly appointed governments created a weak culture 
of opposition and anemic parliamentary activities)8. Paradoxically, it is only under the 
1 See Mattei DOGAN, The Mandarins of Western Europe. The Political Role of the Top Civil 
Servants, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1975, p. 7; Thomas POGUNTKE. Paul WEBB (eds.), 
The Presidentialisation of Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; Bogdan IANCU, 
Legislative Delegation: The Erosion of Normative Limits in Modern Constitutionalism, Springer, 
Berlin, 2012.
2 Olivier COSTA, Eric KERROUCHE, Paul MAGNETTE (eds.), Vers un renouveau du 
parlemen tarisme en Europe?, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2004; Mattei 
DOGAN, “Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, pp. 430-463.
3 Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, Democratic Representation in Europe. Paths of Insti-
tutional Development and Elite Transformations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 418.
4 Mattei DOGAN, ”Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, pp. 430-463.
5 Michael EDINGER, Lars VOGEL, ”Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion…cit.”, p. 377.
6 For the mimic democracy concept see Mattei DOGAN, Analiza statistică a ”democraţiei 
parlamentare în România, Editura Partidului Social Democrat, Bucureşti, 1946, p. 369.
7 See Cristian PREDA, ”Influenţa sistemelor electorale asupra sistemului de partide în 
România interbelică”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 1, 2002, 
p. 42; Keith HITCHINS, România 1866-1947, Romanian transl. by George G. Potra and Delia 
Răzdolescu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 405; Mattei DOGAN, ”L’origine sociale du personnel 
parlementaire d’un pays essentiellement agraire: la Roumanie”, Revue de l’Institut de Sociologie, 
vol. 26, no. 2-3, 1953, pp. 165-208.
8 For instance, according to Hitchins during 1919-1940, out of 4.574 adopted laws 71% 
of them were governmental bills. See Keith HITCHINS, România 1866-1947, cit., p. 406. For a 
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communist rule that the first signs of parliamentarization were formally introduced. 
Although deprived of any substance, the communist constitutional provisions 
designed a political system built on executive-legislative relations highly resembling 
the parliamentary system ideal-type1. In fact, similarly to other authoritarian 
regimes, the Great National Assembly convened only for a few days, twice a year2. 
The MPs main attributes, such as lawmaking or parliamentary oversight, were void 
mechanisms meant to rubberstamp the State Council’s decisions3. Consequently, the 
1989 (re)invention of Romanian democracy imposed the creation from scratch of the 
representative bodies. This endeavor would have required: (1) a genuine reflection 
on the political representation’s social and political roots and (2) the production of 
mechanisms through which the reached political agreement on the representation-
building process could have been translated into codifying procedures and contents 
for the new institutional arrangements. Instead, the rapid and sometimes incoherent 
political reforms and the race towards stabilization impeded the birth of genuine 
debates over coherent projects of democratization. Therefore, constitutional drafting 
in the early 90s was mainly short-term oriented, nesting past heritages with political 
improvisations4. As in other CEE countries, the new institutions were built ”with the 
ruins of the communist past”5 or specifically, in our case, based on the non-reflexive 
denial of the communist heritage (against the ruins of the communist past). Since then, 
few substantial queries were formulated in order to grasp the political foundations 
of ”representation”. In a general context of defective formalistic representation, the 
Romanian MPs were rather coerced to a ”learning by doing” type of behavior, 
continuously adapting their strategies and tactics, while accommodating a precarious 
parliamentary game6. 
Presently, the Romanian Parliament exhibits a rather institutionalized face7, 
which remains however overshadowed by the governmental functioning. The 
comparative analysis developed on this topic Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”Volatilité et stabilisation 
du personnel gouvernemental. Les cabinets roumains 1919-1939 et 1989-2004”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 1, 2007, pp. 71 -95.
1 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiţi. Vot şi putere de la 1831 până în prezent, Polirom, Iaşi, 2011, 
pp. 224-226.
2 For a comparative overview of both authoritarian and democractic parliamentary 
functioning see Amie KREPPEL, ”Legislatures”, in Daniele CARAMANI (ed), Comparative 
Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 159-189.
3 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiţi…cit., p. 258.
4 Bodgan IANCU, ”Constitutionalism in Perpetual Transition: The Case of Romania”, 
in IDEM (ed.), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law Adjudication, Eleven 
International Publishing, Utrecht, 2009, p. 193.
5 David STARK, „Sommes-nous toujours au siècle des transitions? Le capitalisme 
est-européen et la propritété recombinante”, Politix – Revue des Sciences Sociales du Politique, 
no. 47, 1999, pp. 89-129/p. 93. For a similar thesis see David STARK, László BRUSZT, Postsocialist 
Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 1998.
6 Michael EDINGER, Lars VOGEL, “Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion…cit.”, p. 375.
7 Steven D. ROPER, William CROWTHER, ”The Institutionalization of the Romanian 
Parliament: A Case Study of the State-building Process in Eastern Europe”, Southeastern Political 
Review, vol. 26, no. 2, june 1998, pp. 401-426; C. CHIVA, ”The Institutionalisation of Post-
communist Parliaments: Hungary and Romania in Comparative Perspective”, Parliamentary 
Affairs, vol. 60, no 2, 2007, pp. 187-211, Irina IONESCU, ”The Parliamentary Activity of Romanian 
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systemic incapacity of legislatures to act as a vehicle of representation (from an 
institutional perspective) seems to be doubled by a non-representativeness of the 
political elites. If we were to adopt a descriptive definition of political representation, 
as mirroring mechanisms for social stratification1, there is undoubtedly a wide gap 
created between the MPs’ and their constituents (in terms of trajectories and social 
backgrounds2, minority representation3, or gender bias4). However, this prima facie of 
the Romanian Parliaments does not account for the myriad of meanings that can be 
ascribed to the representative functions. Dynamic process that cannot be accounted 
on the sole basis of the constitutional provisions, elites’ structure or institutional 
variables, political representation no longer designates an intrinsic characteristic of its 
subjects. Conversely, its focus lies in the interplay of MPs’ political actions, attitudes 
and opinions, deployed both in Parliament and at the constituency level. As Pitkin 
observed, the MP is essentially ”a professional politician in a framework of political 
institutions, a member of political party who wants to get reelected and a member of 
legislature along with other representatives”5. The nature of his mandate demands 
behavioral refinements consistent with numerous structural and political constraints. 
Table 1
The Romanian MPs’ Political Roles: Perceptions on Political Representation
Mean Std. Variance Agreement* Int. median
MP represents his constituency 4.43 0.87 0.75 0.71 4.66
MP represents his own 
constituents 4.30 1.02 1.05 0.65 4.65
MP represents the entire 
population 4.34 0.83 0.69 0.67 4.59
MP represents his party 3.93 1.09 1.19 0.46 4.11
Data from Romanian MPs Survey (UB). First wave Survey April 2010; Legend: Std- 
standard deviation, Agreement (Van Der Eijk Agreement) – index designed to measure the 
agreement in order rating scales (1- the highest level of agreement, 0- no agreement at all)6.
Opposition Parties: The Cooperative Opposition: A Post-communist Phenomenon?”, CEU 
Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 2006, pp. 22-29.
1 Richard KATZ, ”Party in Democratic Theory”, in Richard KATZ, William CROTTY (eds.), 
Handbook of Party Politics, Sage, London, 2006, pp. 34-47.
2 Laurenţiu ŞTEFAN, Patterns of Political Recruitment, Ziua, Bucureşti, 2004; Andrei 
STOICIU, Les énigmes de la Séduction Politique: Les élites roumaines entre 1989 et 1999, Humanitas, 
Bucureşti, 2000; Irina CULIC, Câştigătorii. Elita Politică şi democratizare în România, 1989-2000, 
Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2002.
3 Ciprian-Călin ALIONESCU, ”Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania”, 
Southeast European Politics, vol. V, no. 1, 2004, pp. 60-75; Ionela BĂLUŢĂ, ”Le parlement 
roumain à l’épreuve du genre. Les femmes politiques dans la législature 2004-2008”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. X, no. 1, 2010, pp. 123-153.
4 Joshua K. DUBROW, ”Women’s Representation in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, 
1992-2005”, International Journal of Sociology, vol. 36, no. 1, 2006, pp. 93-109.
5 Hanna PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 220.
6 For further details see C. VAN DER EIJK, ”Measuring Agreement in Ordered Rating 
Scales”, Quality & Quantity, vol. 35, 2001, pp. 325-341.
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According to Pitkin, being sensitive to the party demands, complying with 
the parliamentary traditions and procedures, adjusting the political actions to 
the constituency claims and at the same time accommodating the party leaders’ 
expectations constitute the main features of the real-life parliamentary activity. From 
this perspective, a survey1 conducted on the Romanian deputies, unveiled rather 
puzzling results (see Table 1). Most of the MPs (around 60%) considered themselves as 
first and foremost ”constituency workers” or ”constituents’ delegates” on the national 
arena. Simultaneously, only half of them ranked the whole population of the country 
as their primary concern. One third of the MPs conceded their party dependence. 
The surprising MPs replies cannot obviously originate from confusing institutional 
arrangements. According to the Constitution, the Romanian Parliament represents 
”the supreme representative body of the Romanian people and the sole legislative 
authority of the country” (article 61, 2003). By the same token, the MPs’ representative 
mandate is clearly defined at the article 69 that specifies: ”In the exercise of their mandate 
Deputies and Senators shall be in the service of the people. Any imperative mandate 
shall be null”. Although it is unlikely that the Romanian MPs inspired themselves 
from the habermasian interpretation of the free mandate’s historical dimensions2 and it 
is more plausible that their preferences for constituency representation were the result 
of the heated electoral reform debates3. Concurrently, the MPs’ perceptions regarding 
the representative mandate can also betray the existence of ”an elaborate network of 
pressures, demands and obligations”, ultimately suggesting current ”disagreements 
among legislators about the proper way to perform their role”4. 
1 The data extracted from the first wave of survey on the Parliamentary population 
developed within the Department of Political Science, UB The questionnaires were applied 
in recorded face-to-face interviews with the Members of the Chamber of Deputies during the 
month of April 2010. The response rate was of 49% (161 out of 331 MPs). The party distribution 
was similar to the overall political configuration of the Parliament at that time. Respondents: 
PNL 29, PDL 64, UDMR 7, PSD-PC 50, Minorities 5, Independents 6. 61.5% of the respondents 
were at their first mandate, while the party seniority was in average of 13 years. Differently 
from the Jena University survey, the MPs were instructed to establish a hierarchy between 
the different facets of representation, nevertheless they were allowed, in the case they were 
unwilling to differentiate between two roles, to choose the same ranking order for more than 
one item.
2 According to Habermas, the free mandate conception was historically introduced rather 
as a sign of MPs’ independence protecting thus the parliamentary elites from political and 
economic pressures. As Habermas states: ”In this phase the free mandate meant, from a 
sociological point of view, not so much the independence of the representative as such; de 
facto, the delegate obviously was in far closer contact with his constituency than has been the 
case ever since. Instead, it was a guarantee of the parity in standing among all private people 
within the public engaged in rational-critical debate. To make sure that the Parliament itself 
would remain part of this public and that the freedom of discussion would be safeguarded…”. 
According to Habermas, the role of free mandate was to prevent the status of representative 
from becoming underprivileged because of delegation. See Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, p. 204.
3 In 2008 a new electoral code was introduced. The MPs are elected according to a PR 
electoral system in single member districts. For further details see Cristian PREDA, ”The 
Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections of November 30, 2008”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. IX, no. 1, 2009, pp. 9-35.
4 Hanna PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 219.
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The abovementioned survey could be considered as illustrative for the manner 
in which the MPs understand (or not) the nature of their mandates (conceived as 
dynamic replies to structural and situational constraints1). In what follows, our 
analysis of political representation refers thus less to the legal provisions (the 
formalistic dimension of political representation) or the citizens’ trust in their 
representatives (the symbolic dimension of representation) as it aims at deconstructing 
the ways in which the Romanian MPs internalize their own status2 in the National 
Assembly, at the constituency level, within their own parties, or when they meet with 
citizens3. Starting from the assumption that ”learning what ’representation’ means 
and learning how to represent are intimately connected”4, this article investigates 
the meanings assigned to political representation as they result from parliamentary 
practices. Contrary to the propensity of canonical studies towards the identification 
and classification of the MPs’ roles5, study will embrace rather a limited scope, trying 
to depict some of the various rationales behind the ambiguous notion of representation 
in the Romanian case. The paper will proceed to a first preliminary analysis of the 
main perceptions and justifications put forward by these elected elites6, contrasting 
them with institutional and official reports on the practice of political representation 
on the parliamentary arena. Three main dimensions are going to be mobilized: (a) the 
relationship between the MPs and their constituency and its current controversies, 
(b) the winding interdependence between MPs and their own parties and, finally, 
(c) the MPs struggles on the national arena (the activity deployed by these elected 
representatives).
1 Michael EDINGER, Lars VOGEL, ”Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion…cit.”, pp. 375-399.
2 Donald SEARING, ”The Role of the Good Constituency Member and the Practice of 
Representation in Great Britain”, Journal of Politics, vol. 47, Mai 1985, pp. 348-381; Olivier 
COSTA, Eric KERROUCHE, Qui sont les députés français?...cit., pp. 23-25.
3 Rudy B. ANDEWEG, ”Role Specialisation or Role Switching? Dutch MPs between 
Electorate and Executive”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 110-127.
4 Hanna PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 1.
5 See for example: Philip NORTON, David M. WOOD, Back from Westminster: British 
Members of Parliament and Their Constituents, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 
1993; Rudy B. ANDEWEG, ”Fractiocracy? Limits to the Ascendancy of the Parliamentary Party 
Group in the Netherlands”, in K. HEIDAR, R. KOOLE (eds.), Parliamentary Party Groups in 
European Democracies, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 89-105; Ludger HELMS, ”Parliamentary 
Party Groups and Their Parties: A Comparative Assessment”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
vol. 6, no. 2, 2000, pp. 104-120.
6 The current article is a preliminary investigation of different meanings of assigned to 
political representation. In what follows the article is based on 30 preliminary in-depth semi-
structured recorded interviews with MPs from all the political families, conducted by the 
author of this article. The MPs replies’ cited in this article are only meant as mere illustrations 
for different representational mechanisms, without assuming the exhaustively of the presented 
facets of the parliamentary work. The interviews are kept anonymous. Given the fact that the 
article does not focus on party distinctions, the party affiliation of the MPs is not presented in 
the text. 
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The Local Dimensions of Representation:
The MPs and their (Imagined) Constituencies
”Constituency workers by definition”, the Romanian MPs are fervent supporters 
of the territorial component of representation. Unlike other cases in the CEE region1, 
these elected representatives do not perceive themselves as speakers for the whole 
country. Evidently, the electoral system and institutional determinants have an 
important role to play in shaping parliamentary representations. As Dogan noted2, in 
the electoral systems with single member constituencies, most of the elected candidates 
tend to become local agents, sort of ”errand boys” willingly communicating at national 
level the voters’ claims. While empirical researches are contradictory in this regard 
(some of them highlighting the absence of substantive differences in parliamentary 
activity between list members and those elected on personal voting3), it is a well-
accepted thesis that modern parliaments have preserved almost intact their territorial 
representative powers4.
The electoral reforms in 2008 introducing single-member districts and the months 
of public debates on the adoption of this bill constitute plausible explanations for the 
MPs expressed preferences. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what does the constituency 
representation entail in the Romanian case? In this respect, Romanian legislation 
cannot provide a clarifying framework for analysis. Fuzzy measures regarding the 
Parliaments’ organization and functioning and few clarifications can be identified in 
what concerns the MPs activity at constituency level. The circumscription dimension 
is only fugitively reminded in the Chamber of Deputies’ Standing orders. For instance, 
article 84 concerning the conduct of the Chamber sittings mentions the parliamentary 
activity at constituency level (during the two main sessions) as one of many other 
parliamentary obligations (art. 84, p. 5) (along with committee, group and plenary 
session activities). Paradoxically, it appears that the territorial dimension becomes 
more salient outside sessions, when the MPs are confined to work either within their 
parliamentary group or in the constituency offices (art. 84, p. 7). Furthermore, art. 37 
in the Law on the MPs’ Statute briefly mentions: ”In their constituency activity, the 
MPs have rights and fulfill obligations related to their legal parliamentary mandate, 
suitably adapted to the nature and specific forms of this activity in the territory”5. No 
other provisions were drafted regarding the codification of these local level activities 
or the institutionalization of the relationship between MPs and their constituents. 
In this context, the theoretical dilemma concerning the nature of representation 
based on a territorial component deepens even further: ”The legislator represents 
neither by a simple response to constituency desires not by detached, Olympian 
1 Michael EDINGER, Lars VOGEL, ”Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion…cit.”, p. 378.
2 Mattei DOGAN, ”Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, p. 431.
3 Jonathan BRADBURY, James MITCHELL, ”The Constituency Work of Members of the 
Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales: Approaches, Relationships and Rules”, 
Regional & Federal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 2007, pp. 117-145/p. 130.
4 Mattei DOGAN, “Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, p. 459.
5 For further details See IPP, ”Parlamentul în afara Parlamentului. Activitatea parlamen-
tarilor în Bucureşti şi în circumscripţii”, the Institute for Public Politics, March 2007, available at 
pasos.org/wp-content/archive/raportIPPromanian.pdf (last accessed at 1st of December 2012).
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judgment on the merits of a proposal”1. Instead, as scholars often emphasized, the 
MPs’ tendency is to act within an intricate network of interdependences. Despite these 
interconnections, the local dimension seems to acquire outmost importance. In the 
Romanian case, long before the electoral reforms were implemented, political parties 
adjusted their recruitment procedures in order to promote local credentials as one 
of the main criteria for selection2. For example, 41.4% MPs had local administrative 
experience within 2004-2008, while recently their proportion reached 49% (2008-2012)3. 
The transformation in the general MPs profile was also followed by a qualitative shift 
in the characteristics of the selected political actors. Contemporary parties do select 
candidates that reside within the constituency in which they run for a parliamentary 
seat (their percentage increased from 63% in 2000 up to 83% in 20084), taming in this way 
the initial propensity of the parties to recruit by cooption or the electoral parachuting 
of outsiders at the local level5. These reconfigurations in the Romanian MPs’ portraits 
depended initially on the party development process. Parties often adopted various 
mechanisms in the promotion of the territorial dimension rewarding in this manner 
the local branches’ electoral activity6. Nevertheless, these leaders’ political profiles can 
also account for the type of political representation the MPs think they provide while 
in office7. As a result, the MPs disposing of local political credentials often justify their 
choices for constituency representation based on the mechanisms of selection:
”Of course you can be a MP and never visit your constituency. However 
most of the MPs are deeply connected with their electoral constituencies. The 
worst party strategy was to parachute their own boys from the center instead of 
allowing local branches to nominate their own candidates. It’s counterproductive. 
First these newcomers on the local scene do not know the people. Secondly, they 
are unaware of the local issues. Consequently, they do tend to run away from 
their constituency and hide under the umbrella of Parliamentary activity at 
central level. Nevertheless, most of the MPs are from those parts of the country 
and they are directly involved in solving local issues. The public perception is 
misleading in this regard”.
The lack of extensive codification, the MPs’ opinions regarding the nature of 
their mandates and their biographical links with the territorial level are nevertheless 
insufficient factors in explaining the meaning that can be ascribed to a constituency 
worker. In contemporary democracies, the importance granted to local issues, the 
creation of local dependencies8, along with the increased pressures put on the MPs 
1 Hanna PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, cit., p. 220.
2 Laurenţiu ŞTEFAN, Patterns…cit.
3 IDEM, ”Political Careers of Romanian MPs: Paths to and From Parliament”, paper 
conference Twenty Years After. Parliamentary Democracy and Parliamentary Representation 
in Post-Communist Europe, Altes Schloss Dornburg, 7-8th of May 2010, p. 10.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem.
6 Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”Les partis politiques roumains. L’histoire d’un développement 
inattendu”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VIII, no. 3, 2008, pp. 589-623.
7 Margit TAVITS, ”Effect of Local Ties on Electoral Success and Parliamentary behavior 
The Case of Estonia”, Party Politics, vol. 16, no. 2, 2010, pp. 21-235/p. 215.
8 Mattei DOGAN, ”Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, pp. 430-463.
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in order to represent the local financial and social interests, have been thoroughly 
debated1. Similarly, on the Romanian political scene, most of the MPs rapidly adapted 
to the unwritten rules of territorial activity, emphasizing the impact of constituency 
work in gathering information and direct feedback from their voters. Notwithstanding, 
the comprehensive descriptions of their local engagements are often (paradoxically) 
associated with the tendency to overemphasize the futility of such endeavors: 
”90 % of the problems addressed to us are not directly linked to the parlia-
mentary activity: there are legal issues, questions concerning the retrocession of 
private properties…. Other claims vary from ’I want some money and a pair of 
panties’ (it really happened) to the real daily life difficulties. They do not know 
how to sue somebody, how to write down a petition, they do not know where to 
go, which institution is concerned by their problems. Most of these demands lay 
within local authorities’ competencies…Either the mayor or the County Council 
president do not solve their problems. Most of the times, we write the petitions 
ourselves, we teach them the basic mechanisms of institutional functioning…. If I 
cannot solve their problems using official channels, I adopt a strategy on the verge 
of political lobbying or influence peddling. I write letters myself and address them 
to mayors or local representatives. I simply say: ’Dear Mr. Mayor, I know that you 
registered an official petition no…. As a Member of the Romanian Parliament 
and elected representative I do ask you to consider that… in accordance with the 
law’…etc. In rare occasions, we also provide legal assistance”. 
That local parliamentary offices (in the cases in which they actually exist) are 
overburdened with citizens’ personal requests does not constitute a novelty2. An IPP 
study conducted in several districts highlighted the existence of this phenomenon 
by the end of 2007. For example, in Iaşi, in three months, the parliamentary offices 
announced that they had received 806 requests, out of which in 763 of the cases they 
had managed to provide an answer3. Direct meetings with the constituents are a 
frequent method chosen to communicate, suggesting the coexistence of traditional 
and modern types of interactivity that not only describe the electoral campaign 
period, but also the daily parliamentary activities4. In spite of a likely tendency to 
overestimate the number of citizens’ claims expressed through various means (letters, 
demands for being directly received by the MP, phone-calls, emails etc.), it is not the 
multitude of these endeavors that constitute the main source of perplexity for the MPs 
and their assistants. Conversely, other reasons are often quoted in order to illustrate 
the confined nature of the constituency representation: the political configuration of 
the political scene, the MPs’ prerogative limitations in solving the voters’ problems or 
the political culture of the constituents. 
In what concerns the first dimension, Romanian MPs put an emphasis on the 
benefits of having strong political ties at the constituency level. The party affiliation 
becomes one of the main assets in collaborating with the local authorities. Although the 
1 Jonathan BRADBURY, James MITCHELL, ”The Constituency Work of Members…cit.”, 
p. 120.
2 Mattei DOGAN, ”Parliamentarians as Errand-Boys…cit.”, p. 438.
3 IPP, ”Parlamentul în afara Parlamentului….cit.”, p. 29.
4 Pippa NORRIS, A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 312-313.
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MPs usually claim to serve primarily their districts, when describing the constituency 
work, they do overemphasize the importance of political coherence (similar political 
affiliations for mayors and the MPs). From this perspective, the opinions of two 
opposing MPs support the same thesis: the effectiveness of territorial representation 
is above all a function of party coherence: 
”Citizens’ expectations greatly differ from those of the parliamentary games. 
There are few opportunities to initiate bills targeting the territorial dimension, 
even though people expect you to do this. They require your presence at the 
constituency level.... But in order to genuinely represent my district I should 
have the means to do so. For example, I’ve been waiting for a ministry response 
for more than 3 months…and nothing happened”.
”As members of the governmental party, our activity at constituency level 
is less demanding… Politics often defies the social realm. Many of the problems 
that should be solved are in the hands of government and thus the constituency’ 
political color is of a great importance”.
Political deadlocks often emerge due to lack of cooperation at the elite level and to 
party clashes. If the MPs meet in average four times per month with local authorities1, 
this frequency remains highly dependent on the political affiliation of the elected 
officials2. However, for some officials the political impasse is often unraveled through 
personal links and the maximization of experience in local politics. Responses such 
as ”I do have over 30 years experience in public administration and I’ve met with 
lots of persons during all this time” function as an alternative route meant to elude 
political disputes. Consequently, the Romanian MPs do seem to follow an established 
pattern, according to which an ”active engagement in local politics indicates that the 
candidate is knowledgeable about local issues and problems”, and he is ”willing and 
able to tackle them”3. In the absence of such direct experiences, local alliances and 
the instrumentalisation of trust come often into play, especially during the electoral 
campaigns. Opinion leaders from religious associations, landlord associations, ethnic 
minority representatives are often quoted as sources for political support. They tend to 
mediate between political actors and local constituents, rejuvenating the Lazerfeldian 
two-step flow of communication model. Conversely, profound knowledge about the 
local level’ social and political configurations also implies the disincentive to engage 
in a traditional constituency work, in some cases even the temporary withdrawal 
from any direct grassroots engagements:
”Then I receive the electors at my office… I do not organize these classical 
audiences in the traditional way, as they are dust in the wind. I do not think that 
meeting every Friday with 70 persons standing in line in order to see me for a five 
minute conversation might actually work out. Indeed, those that have persistent 
problems that cannot be solved by my assistants are scheduled for audiences on 
a monthly basis. I know as such that I have to meet with six persons and that I 
can really discuss with them. In rural areas, it rarely happens that these meetings 
are truly effective…Last week I met with different persons that really insisted to 
1 IPP, ”Parlamentul în afara Parlamentului…cit.”, p. 32.
2 Ibidem, p. 34.
3 Margit TAVITS, ”Effect of Local Ties…cit.”, p. 217.
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see me, there were no cases in which my presence was actually necessary. They 
just wanted to restate their problem, to thank me, etc.…”.
Aside from the above-mentioned objective constraints or other (more subjective) 
impediments in the constituency work, there is however little reflection on the 
substance of political representation. Who are those to be represented? For it has 
been emphasized that in order to refer to constituency representation as a ”credible 
device for aggregating knowledge”, the MPs would have to be aware of/share the 
agenda of their constituents, and this can only happen in the presence of rather 
homogenous constituency interests1. Instead, the Romanian MPs tend to cut the 
Gordian knot by simply focusing on the parliamentary work framed as a bureaucratic 
activity. The mandate of the MPs evolved into the role of major public services supplier 
within the region, assuming the burden of representation sometimes thought of a 
political strategy focused on the next electoral contests and strategic communication. 
As another MP declared, reinforcing the previous description:
”The constituency links are fundamental: However, half of this parliamentary 
activity is highly useful, half of it only necessary for public image. For instance, 
there are the town meetings. Many of the issues raised by the people, around 
90% of them, have nothing to do with the parliamentary work. Beyond the MPs’ 
personal authority and the little pressure they can put on an institution or another, 
they have no jurisdiction. However, this helps in establishing connections with 
the constituents: they see you, they know you. In the meanwhile, you could 
have documented yourself, drafted bills, written down amendments, but people 
do expect you to go and meet them and therefore you go…. I do take on the 
problems that I can really solve. It depends a lot on the nature of the issue…It 
is a kind of a public service, civil service. Surely, when they come to my office, 
usually things do progress under my signature. It’s a about paving the way for 
them. It helps a lot, but it takes a lot time”.
As such, the subtle tension implied by constituency representation and the 
unsolved problems of asymmetry2 are less present in the parliamentary replies. The 
Romanian MPs tend to automatically internalize the constituency work as an ordinary 
(but profitable) obligation without even asking themselves to what extent their projected 
incumbency is actually related to their local performance. If the MP represents first 
and foremost his or her constituency, the meaning that can be associated with this 
activity remains rather obscured. In this regard, some of the MPs also underline the 
two-way information flow. The MPs’ constituency level role rests upon their ability 
to become national political agents, informing local authorities and the electorate 
1 Russel HARDIN, ”An Exact Epitome of the People”, in Richard BAUMAN, Tsvi KAHANA 
(eds.), The Least Examined Branch, The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p. 39.
2 The unsolved problem with asymmetry in the overall comprehension of political accoun-
tability regards the fact that the electorate is rather uninformed about the political decisions 
and the MPs behavior. Practically, the retrospective voting activities are rare in contemporary 
democracies. For further details see Jane S. SCHACTER, ”Political Accountability, Proxy 
Accountability and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures”, in Richard BAUMAN, Tsvi 
KAHANA (eds.), The Least Examined Branch…cit., p. 47.
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about the decisions undertaken on the national arena. Partially abandoning their 
statute of ”middlemen service providers in the communication between state agencies 
and citizens”, the MPs emerge as providers of knowledge, controlling distorted or 
hidden information about the governmental functioning. Within this framework, the 
MPs shifted towards ”more impersonal channels of mass-media” maximizing their 
communicative contacts and somehow diluting the territorial dimension of their 
activities1. The monthly or weekly press conferences and the press releases complete 
thus the parliamentary activity often associated with the territorial dimension.
”At the constituency level, I hold press conferences and I do have public 
appearances in local talk-shows as I try to become an information loudspeaker 
for my electorate.”
The MPs preferences for mediated channels of communication came as no 
surprise. The expansion of parliamentary forms of publicity (following deep structural 
transformations within the public sphere) transforms the very nature of political 
representation, diminishing its substance and scope2. The quest for public exposure, 
resulting also from the adjustment of political communication to the new technologies 
implies ”the scientific engineering and targeting of messages that subordinate the 
ideals of deliberation and transparency to the achievement of narrow political 
goals” and impacts not only the political realm but also the interest articulation and 
voting behavior of the constituents3. As such, in present day societies ”politicians 
generally attain power because of their media talents, not because they resemble their 
constituents socially or they are close to them”4. Although this tendency has been 
interpreted as one of the causes for the widening gap between politics and society, 
most of Romanian MPs underline the importance of this form of linkage with their 
electorate. The 2007 IPP study revealed the MPs’ propensity in creating strong and 
good relations with the press (also reflected by the content of the written articles 
published in the newspapers). From the impressive amount of 4.000 articles covering 
the MPs activities in national newspapers, only 15% of these occurrences were framed 
in a negative manner. The wide majority of these articles adopted a rather a neutral 
tone. As such, Manin’s opinion democracy seems emerge in the Romanian case, at least 
in what concerns political leaders’ role perception. 
The emphasis placed on the personal nature of the representative relationship 
conducted at the local level can signal the political leader’s autonomy from his party 
and the return of some features of the parliamentarianism5. Nevertheless, when 
1 Andrea RÖMMELE, ”Political Parties, Party Communication and new Information and 
Communication Technologies”, Party Politics, vol. 9, 2003, pp. 7-9.
2 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation…cit., pp. 205-206.
3 W. Lance BENNETT, Jarol B. MANHEIM, ”The Big Spin: Strategic Communication and 
the Transformation of Pluralist Democracy”, in W. Lance BENNETT, Robert M. ENTMAN 
(eds.), Mediated Politics. Communication in the Future Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p. 282.
4 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997, p. 193.
5 Parliamentary defined as the non-party mediated relationship between leader and 
follower. For further details see Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, 
cit., p. 219.
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questioned about the relationship with mainstream media channels, the opinions of 
the MPs are divided. Preoccupied by their public images and less attentive to the 
programmatic proposals, the MPs are at the same time confined in their activities by 
the television broadcasting1 constraints. Trust becomes once again a central element in 
shaping the representative government2. Within this context, the territorial boundaries 
of the constituency become blurred and the relationship with citizens passes through 
the media contacts (and their power in shaping symbolic forms of representation). 
In this regard, several critical remarks emerged pinpointing the fact that television 
networks are to be blamed for the citizens’ lack of confidence in the parliamentary 
activities. 
”The parliamentary activity does not consist in being confined to one chair. 
For instance, the Romanian television just recorded me while I was speaking 
over my mobile phone. I bet this evening I’ll be on TV.” 
Or: ”Unfortunately, the public image of the MPs is misleading. Many of the 
MPs exposed by the media are persons that really have done something good in 
Parliament.”
These critiques are centered on television journalism. Indeed our monitoring 
of the news channels during 2009-2011 period3 shows the increased participation of 
MPs as main spokesmen of party messages. From the total of 385 political guests, 
most of them were MPs (183, 47,5% of the sum total). Every evening, the MPs are 
becoming the party faces, more than any other category of professional politicians 
(11,2% were members of the executive branch, 14,3% local representatives etc). In 
fact, this tendency appears to reinforce the personal dimension of representation4. 
Some of these leaders become almost permanent guests of different talk shows. If 
most of the MPs (113 persons) were present on the main television channels under 
20 times (61,7%), almost 20 MPs were participating in over 80 different televised 
debates. The prevalence of MPs presence in party communication cannot be 
questioned. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to underline the introduction of a criterion 
for distinction and parliamentary polarization between the ”media leaders” on one 
side and ”anonymous back-benchers”5. The shifting accountability of national leaders 
towards survey analysis and public reactions to the televised debates6, questions as 
such the substance of political representation at least in what concerns the meaning of 
constituency work and local predominance in defining political mandates.
1 Erik NEVEU, ”De quelques incidences des medias sur les systèmes démocratiques”, 
Réseaux, vol. 18, no.100, 2000, p. 127.
2 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., p. 221.
3 The political talk-shows taken into consideration were broadcasted on Antena 3, Antena 
2, Realitatea TV, B1 TV, TVR 1, Prima TV on prime-time (March 2009-February 2001). The 
political distribution of party representatives in these talk shows was PDL=1.680, PNL=1.880, 
PSD=2.110, UDMR=337, PC=346, Minorities=21, PRM&PNG=188, UNPR=91. 
4 This tendency is reinforced by the MEPs public exposure (5,5% of guests). For the 
analyzed period, 64% of the Romanian MEP intervened in the internal political debates.
5 Erik NEVEU, ”De quelques incidences des medias…cit.”, p. 114.
6 Ibidem, p. 126.
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MPs in the Service of Political Parties: 
Political Representation as a Form of Unreliability
The MPs’ allegiance to the territorial dimension is highly visible in their replies. 
Constituency workers, the deputies tend to overemphasize the importance of their 
involvement in local politics, transforming the parliamentary mission in a sort of 
bureaucratic type of representation of citizens’ needs and wants. Nevertheless, 
for the Romanian MPs, the party variable recurrently remerges when it comes to 
the effective mechanisms of parliamentary activity. Despite the fact that the party 
representation ranks lower on their priorities, being the most divisive category in the 
parliamentary survey, it appears that the power of the party organization in explaining 
parliamentary work is still a cardinal dimension in their comprehension of the MPs’ 
mandate. At a first glance, the pivotal role of the parties is framed as a good-provider 
for various resources, such as political networks, financial distribution of incentives, 
and sometimes of local connections (through alliances forged with opinion leaders). 
Yet, beyond these basic and marginal functions, Romanian parties still preserve an 
important place in the overall comprehension of the MPs’ representative functions.
Unlike the case of other democracies, where the individuality of a candidate 
determines constituents’ choices1, in the Romanian case, numerous studies have 
highlighted the importance of voting according to the party lines, despite electoral 
reforms. Evidently, the salience of the party dimension greatly differs from the ideal-
typical model of a programmatic party democracy. The under-institutionalization 
of the Romanian party system and a sui generis type of party development2 imply 
a rather unsubstantiated homology between the citizens’ electoral choices and the 
party traditional roles in channeling political representation. As such, if in established 
democracies parties firstly became the ”crucial intermediaries in the game of 
representation, making it possible to establish strong linkages between mass public 
and its representatives”3, on the Romanian political scene it appears that the nature 
of the party-voter linkage is shaped rather by party labels (due to the weak party 
implantation within society, shallow ideology, numerous party splits and mergers). 
Within this framework, the MPs’ statements do admit the party prevalent position. 
Nevertheless, the party reign is particularly important when referred to the candidate 
selection process. As in other democracies, the procedural functions of political parties 
remained untouched by their endemic decline or lack of articulation4. 
The candidate selection process for different offices is one of the main party 
prerogatives that automatically tame the MPs ambitions for party unreliable 
1 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., p. 219.
2 For the analysis of the main party characteristics in the Romanian case see: Tom 
GALLAGHER, ”The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy: Romania 
and Portugal Compared”, in G. PRIDHAM, P. LEWIS, (eds.), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: 
Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, Routledge, New York, 1996, 
pp. 206-229; Cristian PREDA, Partide şi alegeri în România post-comunistă: 1989-2004, Ed. Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2005.
3 Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, Democratic Representation in Europe…cit., p. 419.
4 Peter MAIR, Stefano BARTOLINI, ”Challenges to Contemporary Political Parties”, in 
Larry DIAMOND, Richard GUNTHER (eds), Political Parties and Democracy, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 2001, pp. 327-343.
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behavior (such as dissent-shrinking or political sabotage)1. Hence, whether the party 
organization chooses to decentralize the selection process, given autonomy to the 
local branches or conversely to centralize the candidates recruitment impact greatly 
on the degree of these elites’ party loyalty. By the same token, the inclusiveness of 
the selection procedures allowing the pervasiveness of party strata or the selection 
of outsiders can directly alter the level of party unity and the control that the party 
leadership can exercise on its representatives in public offices2. Although the myriad of 
candidate selection procedures greatly varies in relation with the electoral system and 
institutional contexts as well as with different party traditions3, the party as recruitment 
agency undoubtedly still preserves its oversight function over its representatives and 
their behavior4. Particularly in the Romanian case, the lower levels of incumbency 
(and thus parliamentary professionalization), doubled by increasing levels of party 
seniority, suggests that the party trajectory or the party support became one of the 
fundamental criteria for promotion in the parliamentary game (almost two thirds of 
the MPs exhibits a long party experience prior to their election in office)5. Similarly, 
these patterns of selection can also suggest the organizational capacity of parties to 
retaliate in cases of indiscipline. The MPs are thus indirectly coerced to become party 
spokespersons and less individual and autonomous actors, personal representatives 
of the constituents’ demands. 
However, the ”partization” of parliamentary trajectories is a necessary but 
insufficient condition in assessing the parliamentary reliability of these representatives6. 
This prima facie assessment of the relationship between party organizations and MPs, 
based solely on recruitment procedures, appears to be invalidated by the Romanian 
MPs behavior. A brief overview on the MPs trajectories in Parliament suggest that 
the ex ante screening mechanisms7 meant to produce party loyalists are falling flat 
1 Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, ”Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Dele-
gation and Accountability Work”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3, May 2000, 
pp. 321-322. 
2 Gideon RAHAT, ”Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 18, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 157-170/p. 166; Michael GALLAGHER, ”Introduction”, 
in Michael GALLAGHER, Michael MARSH (eds.), The Secret Garden: Candidate Selection in 
Comparative Perspective, Sage, London 1988, pp. 1-2; Reuven Y HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, 
”Candidate Selection Methods and Consequences”, in Richard KATZ, William CROTTY (eds.), 
Handbook of Party Politics, Sage, London, 2006, pp. 110; Angelo PANEBIANCO, Political Parties: 
Organization and Power, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 27, 36, 39, 43.
3 See Reuven Y HAZAN, Gerrit VOERMAN, ”Electoral Systems and Candidate Selec tion”, 
Acta Politica, vol. 41, no. 2. 2006, pp. 146-162; Paul PENNINGS, Reuven Y HAZAN, ”Demo-
cratizing Candidate Selection: Causes and Consequences”, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, May 2001, 
pp. 267-275.
4 Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, ”Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies...cit.”, pp. 309-333/
pp 327-328. See also Richard KATZ, ”The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party 
Democracy”, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 277-296/p. 277.
5 Cristina CHIVA, ”The Institutionalization of Post-Communist Parliaments: Hungary and 
Romania in a Comparative Perspective”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2, 2007, pp. 187-211/
pp. 201-202.
6 Rudy B. ANDEWEG, ”Ministers As Double Agents? The Delegation Process between 
Cabinet and Ministers”, European Journal of Political Research, no. 37, 2000, pp. 377-395. 
7 Kaare STROM, ”Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization”, in Herbert 
DORING (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, 
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on the party faces. During recent times, the parliamentary switching attainted 
impressive rates1. For example during the 2008-2012 legislature, from 471 MPs, 94 of 
them migrated at least one time from one parliamentary group to another2. Without 
following a precise pattern, parliamentary migration touched almost 20% of the 
MPs. These defections can be read as a result of the electoral system change and the 
non-mediated relationship established with the constituency. Concomitantly, these 
results are highly contradictory to the process by which parties recently favored the 
selection of candidates directly linked with the territorial grounds. The idea that ”MPs 
elected from districts where they were born or reside are less likely to break party 
unity than other MPs”3 is rather unsupported by the Romanian realities in which 
the parliamentary majorities have been recomposed at massive rates during the last 
legislature. 
The parliamentary party switching is not a Romanian idiosyncrasy. ”Political 
tourism” has also been encountered in Brazil, touching 39% in 1991-1994 and 36% 
in 1998-2001, in Italy where this phenomenon stroke 33,7% of the MPs (1992-1004) 
and 31,1% in (1996-2000), not to mention the Ukrainian case, where similar processes 
reached in the 1998-2002 period 56% of the parliamentarians4. Likewise, visible fluidity 
of these party representatives was also encountered in the CEE new democracies 
(particularly in Poland) where the MP candidates’ defections shifted from structural 
forms of migration (resulting from party organizational changes) towards increasing 
levels of voluntary, individual party switching5. For instance, in the Polish case 
in 1997, 14% of the candidates previously ran under the label of a different party, 
while in 1996 Czech elections their percentage touched 10,6%6. Party switching often 
raises normative and theoretical implications7 with respect to the nature of political 
representation. Even though parliamentary migration is not exceptional in modern 
democracies, the Romanian case exhibits impressive records, often resulting from MPs 
strategic behavior, seeking re-election. To be fair, these unreliable practices remain for 
the most part unsanctioned by the general public: 40% of the MPs that switched their 
party affiliation prior to the elections in 2012 and ran again were able to win a new 
parliamentary seat8. Additionally, these parliamentary defections are only ”burglar 
pp. 51-81/p. 76. See also Kaare STRØM, ”Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation”, in Kaare 
STRØM, Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Torbjörn BERGMAN (eds.), Delegation and Accountability in 
Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 55-109.
1 For the Romanian political scene the percentages quoted at the level of the literature 
are 17% party switching in 1996-2000 and 10% in 2000-2004. See William B. HELLER, Carol 
MERSHON, Legislative Party Switching, Parties and Party Systems, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2009, p. 12.
2 IPP, ”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008 - 2012”, Bucharest, September 
2012, Seria de Rapoarte de monitorizare a activităţii parlamentare, available at www.ipp.ro/protfiles.
php?IDfile=162 (last accessed at 3rd of January 2013)
3 Margit TAVITS, ”Effect of Local Ties…cit.”, p. 229.
4 William B. HELLER, Carol MERSHON, Legislative Party Switching…cit., p. 4.
5 Goldie SHABAD, Kazimierz M. SLOMCZYNSKI, ”Inter-party Mobility among Parlia-
mentary Candidates in Post-Communist East Central Europe”, Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 2, 
2004, p. 170.
6 Ibidem, p. 155.
7 William B. HELLER, Carol MERSHON, Legislative Party Switching…cit., p. 4.
8 See IPP, Press release, ”Consecinţele actualului sistem electoral: 117 parlamentari în plus, 
mai puţini parlamentari noi, un Parlament mai îmbătrânit, scădere evidentă a numărului de 
242
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 2 • 2013
ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU
alarms” for party organizations and their internal functioning and not a sign per se of 
the MP’s autonomy in relations with party politics’ representation. 
The party organization abandonment is only one (extreme) form of disloyal/
autonomous behavior. From an historical perspective, the party dimension of 
representation not only implies the leaders’ loyalty expressed through the preservation 
of the same party label, but also targets the transformation of the MPs into genuine 
party servants and their complete submission to the party decisions. As Cotta and 
Verzichelli noted:
”At the same time, they [political parties] have progressively ’captured’ the 
elected representatives transforming them from relatively independent players 
into the instruments of their political play. Because of the control acquired by 
parties on parliamentary recruitment, and the establishment of a strong party 
discipline in the representative assemblies, parliamentarians have, in some 
sense, become ’party servants’ and they have been recruited by parties according 
to their needs”1.
The unchallenged party leaders’ control, the party constraints on the MPs opinions 
(following the electoral programs guidelines) describe the party model of representation. 
The party’s ruling restricts the freedom of action of these elected representatives2 
imposing a strict discipline. The ideal of party – vector-of- political representation 
transformed thus the MP in a delegate receiving ”an imperative mandate by his party” 
while the Parliament [implicitly the parliamentary representation] becomes ”a place 
where instruction bound appointees meet to put their predetermined decisions on 
record”3. Against all odds, the Romanian MPs do not clamor against party discipline. 
A previous survey conducted on the Romanian Parliament, in 2003, at a time when 
undisciplined acts were still stemmed by party control, showed that only 8% of the 
MPs considered that more freedom of action should be granted to the MPs, while 
14% of them considered that the same level of party discipline should be conserved. 
On the other hand, the wide majority of the MPs were enthusiastic supporters for 
additional party discipline4. The compulsory nature of party discipline finds multiple 
ways of expression: supporting party claims in public discourses or backing party 
initiatives and leaders. However, voting behavior in Parliament remains one of the 
main avenues for identifying the MP’s alignments to the organizational directives. 
From this perspective, the MPs discourses and their behavior in Parliament seem to 
converge. During the last legislative term (2008-2012) the MPs (rather surprisingly) 
voted according to the party lines5; both the members of the governmental coalition 
juristi”, available on the IPP website (accessed at http://www.ipp.ro/pagini/consecin355ele-
actualului-sistem-elec.php).
1 Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, Democratic Representation in Europe…cit., p. 419.
2 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., pp. 194-195.
3 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation…cit., p. 205.
4 Laurentiu ŞTEFAN, Sergiu GHERGHINA, Mihail CHIRU, ”We All Agree that We 
Disagree Too Much: Attitudes of Romanian MPs towards Party Discipline”, East European 
Politics, vol. 28, no. 2, 2012, pp.180-192/p. 186.
5 PDL exhibited loyalty towards the political group of 97,4% (std. 5,19), the UDMR as 
an ethnic party preserved its tradition of voting according to their party lines mean 96,71% 
(std. 2,04). Likewise, the ethnic minority groups preserved their homogeneity in voting with 
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and those of the opposition exhibit an average of over 90% party loyalty in voting 
different bills. Furthermore, the MPs declared themselves party servants recalling their 
role as elected representatives within a party democracy. As one of the MPs stated:
”Voting discipline represents a fundamental rule that should be obeyed. 
Once you’ve taken on some programmatic issues during the electoral contest 
then you’re bound to obey and stand by them. Surely, besides these commitments 
there are personal points of view meant to promote and defend the constituency’s 
interests, but this can only happen within the limits of the previous electoral 
engagements, no matter the party status: as a part of governmental majority or 
in opposition”.
Despite the continuous political tourism, the Romanian MPs follow party 
lines. Similar with other cases1, they appear to be highly disciplined. The rare forms 
of disloyalty are justified (as in the case of party switching) by party derailments2. 
Having in mind their incumbency objective, the MPs explain their desertions as forms 
of direct accountability. Their unreliable conduct should be seen as an enhancement 
of the particular will of the constituents3 that voted a political program4. 
”A political party disposes of a party program that is more substantiated than 
the expectations of a group of citizens that sometimes contradicts it. The party 
program is a coherent set of solutions that responds to a social need nationally 
defined. However, a certain balance between the party program and the citizens’ 
needs should be struck. There were situations in which I did not vote in the way 
in which the party demanded: firstly, because I felt connected with the citizens 
that voted for me (I’ve already won two mandates as mayor and two as a MP 
and I am highly aware of the importance of maintaining credible records in 
front of the citizens) and secondly, when the party requested me to vote against 
the governmental program (because this also happened) or against a question 
socially sensitive. But such conducts lays you open to party sanctions.”
”The party discipline can be counterproductive, since it reduces the quality 
of parliamentary activity. The governmental will prevails over the MP’s options 
an average of 96,12 (std. 3,06). On the opposite side of the political spectrum both major 
parliamentary groups preserved a high degree of discipline, although their internal cohesion 
varies more than in the previous cases. As such the social democrats succeeded in preserving 
their MPs allegiance 93,10% (std.11,19%), and to lower rates so did the liberals (PNL mean 
91,57% (std.12,61%). From this perspective, even the UNPR group (formed in Parliament as 
a result from party switches of the MPs) displays rather high loyalty rates, even though these 
are accompanied by important discrepancies within group (average 88,18%, sdt. 15,06). Data 
compiled using the IPP monitoring on the MP’s individual behavior for the 2004-2008 period. 
The MPs records available at http://www.alesiivoteaza.ro/2008/parlamentari/deputati (last 
accessed at 10th of January 2013)
1 For example, the analysis of parliamentary behavior developed on the German case 
showed that ”four out of ten strong supporters of party discipline have dissented from their 
faction in an important vote at least once during their parliamentary career”.  Michael EDINGER, 
Lars VOGEL, ”Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion…cit.”, p. 382.
2 William B. HELLER, Carol MERSHON, Legislative Party Switching…cit., pp. 4-5.
3 Margit TAVITS, ”Effect of Local Ties…cit.”, p. 218.
4 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., p. 196.
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even though the MPs are following the claims of the initial government program. 
Usually, the interest groups are highly altering the quality of different bills, while 
the influence of the MPs is less important in representing the citizen’s claims.”
The intricate relationship between loyalty/disloyalty towards a party reveals 
a puzzling image. Although the MPs avoid exposing themselves to public criticism 
and they openly admit their strategy to forsake the parties in some occasions, they 
seem at the same time to embrace rather a party-mandate rationale for their behavior. 
Exposing themselves to political sanctions, often ending in the exit option and political 
migration, they simultaneously display high records of loyalty. 
The party prevalence on the parliamentary arena is however misleading. The 
above-mentioned political records express rather the outspoken MPs’ devoted 
or defective positions. If party discipline refers first and foremost to the ability of 
parties to act and influence the parliamentary decisions both in plenary sessions and 
within committees, then another indicator of unreliability should be added: the MPs’ 
attendance rates. During recent years, public scrutiny increasingly shifted towards the 
MPs willingness to participate in parliamentary activities1. Once again, the MPs are 
backing their parliamentary party groups, declaring themselves strong supporters of 
more party discipline (even those who openly declared disregard for parliamentary 
rules and voted on the behalf of their colleagues):
”I would undertake severe actions against those that do not participate 
in the debates. I voted once for one of my colleagues, but that was it. But the 
procedures allow such behavior; you can borrow the voting cards. The attendance 
list is usually filled out by three or four MPs, although parliamentary regulations 
specify that there can be financial sanctions for the absentees”.
Despite these ”public” declarations of their allegiance towards the parliamentary 
work, the overall attendance rates for the parliamentary parties unveil these 
organizations’ incapacity to oversight and mobilize their own MPs. The MPs tend to 
back up their parties in voting procedures in more than 90% of the cases. However, 
their disagreement is often expressed through absenteeism. The contrast between high 
rates of loyalty and attendance levels discloses the seeds of an actual free mandate 
type of behavior2. The alarming situation in the Senate, where more than one third 
of the MPs skipped decisive voting sessions, is thus signaling a different form of 
parliamentary refutation of the in the service of party’s referential. Several statements in 
this regard emphasize, in a contradictory manner, the MPs’ need for more autonomy 
within highly centralized political parties. 
”The attendance oversight is an abnormal type of behavior. To spy on your 
own MPs, to see whether they are or not present in the plenary sessions… How to 
vote on the main political issues is decided within the Party’s Permanent Bureau, 
1 IPP, ”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012”, cit.
2 The average attendance level for the Chamber of deputies: PDL 76%, UDMR 77%, PSD 
64%, PNL 67%, UNPR 71%, and even lower in the Senate: PDL 65%, UDMR 57%, PSD 61%, 
PNL 56%, UNPR 58%. Source: IPP, ”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012”, 
cit., p. 48.
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following the party program. By the same token, the vote is also discussed within 
the parliamentary group. This does not exclude individual opinions. I am one of 
the persons that voted differently on several occasions. However it is a political 
vote which differs from the electoral vote.” 
”The MP slowly but steadily learns that he is unfortunately not responsible 
in front of his public or its constituency, but rather depends on the party 
president. It does not matter if you have good or bad solutions; all it counts is to 
have a central party endorsement. The MPs tend to vote mechanically, following 
a party order.”
”My main complaint as a member of a governmental party starts from the 
fact that the MPs’ opinions are overlooked by the parliamentary group leaders and 
by the national party leadership. The national party leaders insufficiently consult 
with us and their interest levels regarding citizens’ demands are rather low.”
The Romanian MPs describe rather contradictory perceptions regarding their roles 
as party representatives. The democratic-party mandate is present, but highly criticized by 
the MPs that denounce the existence of the unique prerogative of the party leadership 
to decide1. Consequently, on the one hand, the MPs remain highly dependent on their 
party selection. Their behavior towards their own party organization remains highly 
loyal when referring to the voting records. On the other hand, alternatives routes of 
bypassing the monitoring procedures amplify party switching. Evidently, in some of 
the cases, the low rates of attendance are also resulting from a party strategy, since 
on several occasions the national party leaders decided to postpone the debates by 
way of ensuring a lack of quorum. Nevertheless, the MPs’ mobilization levels remain 
a solid indicator for the party politics failure in Parliament. Consequently, the MPs 
unreliability towards their organizations suggests in recent times the inadequacy of 
the party ex ante control mechanisms, and this in spite of the fact that the Romanian 
MPs do admit that they remain highly dependent on their selectorates. Parties partially 
succeed to pounder the MPs actions particularly through the partization2 of political 
careers and the confinement of well-needed political networks of support. Empowered 
political leaders, that understand political representation as a form of personal 
strategic action (hence their political defections), the MPs are however fully aware of 
the web of political interdependences, in which they are caught and seek sui generis 
escape routes in order to draw personalized autonomy boundaries. Hence, political 
representation becomes a defective sort of party representation, implying a continuous 
struggle between parties and their delegates on the national arena.
On the National Arena:
The Fight for Political Recognition
The MPs’ opinions regarding the constituency and party representation are 
contradictory in nature. The MPs tend to consider themselves as constituency 
representatives, a sort of bureaucrats that lobby on the behalf of their voters. Their 
activity seems to be confined by their party affiliation and intra-organizational power 
1 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., p. 214.
2 Maurizio COTTA, Luca VERZICHELLI, Democratic Representation in Europe…cit., p. 424.
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games. Therefore, the MPs’ activity within the National Assembly should thus reflect 
not only the way in which they understand the burden of political representation as 
being ”in the service of the people”, but also the manner in which the dynamic process 
of representation is circumscribed within the national arena. The political discretion1 
exhibited by the Romanian MPs’ actions is granted by the evolutions within society 
and the configuration of a rather weak party system. The homologous formulas of 
opinion democracy create the premises for maximizing the MPs’ partial independence 
not only from their parties, but also in relations to their constituents as ”electoral 
promises take the form of relatively hazy images”2. Ad contrario, the macro level trends 
regarding the presidentialization of political regimes and the predominance of the 
executive actions3 (also present in the Romanian case4) seem to foster the creation of 
”ghostly” parliamentary activities. Nevertheless, in what follows, it is less the process 
of delegation and its configuration that interests us5, as we are rather concerned with 
the definition of political representation through the glances of the MPs’ activities at 
national level. 
Unlike constituency work, central-level parliamentary activity is a highly 
regulated domain. According to article 61 in the Romanian Constitution, lawmaking 
is a cornerstone parliamentary function, the Parliament being ”the sole legislative 
authority of the country”. Despite the creation of explicit mechanisms meant to 
define the Parliaments’ role and structure in the legislative process, it is the legislating 
function of this institution that was seriously put to the test during the recent years. 
Let us consider first the case of the legislative initiative. Although according to the 
1991 Constitution the initiative lies with the Government, the Parliament or the 
public, it remains de facto a governmental monopoly. A simple review of the laws 
adopted by the Parliament reveals the overwhelming share of bills initiated by the 
executive. Between 1989 and 2011, from 5.486 laws, 4.825 originated with the executive 
(87.95%)6. Albeit this percentage slightly decreases during the last legislature (2008-
2012) to 74%7, the considerable governmental capture of the Parliament’s political 
agenda remains a resilient reality of Romanian post-communism. However, the 
executive-legislative imbalance in drafting legislation is not necessarily an outcome 
of the anemic parliamentary activity. For example, until 2008, the Romanian deputies 
1 Anna GRZYMALA-BUSSE, ”The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions Post communist 
Party Competition and State Oversight”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 10, December 
2006, pp. 1-30/pp. 3-5.
2 Bernard MANIN, The Principles of Representative Government, cit., p. 228.
3 Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB, ”The Presidentialisation of Politics in Democratic 
Societies: A Framework”, in IDEM (eds.), The Presidentialisation of Politics, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 5.
4 Bodgan IANCU, ”Constitutionalism in Perpetual Transition: The Case of Romania”, 
in IDEM (ed.), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law Adjudication, Eleven 
International Publishing, Utrecht, 2009, p. 194. 
5 For the analysis of the process of delegation in the Romanian case and the comprehensive 
presentation of the quantifiable parliamentary activity and the institutional arrangements see 
Alexandra IONAŞCU, Les élites politiques et la prise de decision gouvernementale. Considérations sur 
le cas roumain, ULB, 2008, unpublished thesis; first chapter ”On the Governmental Power”. The 
current section of the article only refers to some aspects of the delegation process and presents 
illustrative examples in order to provide the general frame for the MPs responses.
6 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiţi…cit., p. 305.
7 IPP, ”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012”, cit.
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initiated 2.486 legislative proposals. However only 549 (22.08%) of these initiatives 
concluded all the stages of the legislative process and became laws. Likewise, the 
2008-2012 legislature follows similar pathways. Even though the MPs table (on 
average) twelve proposals per week (representing 67% of the total number of the 
initiatives registered in Parliament), their proposals are either indefinitely pending or 
are directly rejected (97% out of rejected projects were drafted by the MPs)1. Openly 
admitting their marginal roles in the legislative process, the MPs formulate multiple 
justifications for the government’s overbearing actions. 
Firstly, the government predominance is interpreted as an overall malfunction of 
the Parliament (from an organizational and administrative point of view). The high 
number of proposals rejected by the Assembly is dependent on the way in which the 
MPs’ activity is defined in the Standing orders of the two Chambers. The lack of a well-
trained parliamentary administration and the civil servants’ direct subordination to 
the Committee’s presidents and vice-presidents or to the party group leaders deprive 
the MPs of the well needed political and legal expertise required when drafting new 
legislation. For instance, one of the MPs declared to us:
”I have to be honest and admit that parliamentary initiatives are rare. At 
the same time, the technical apparatus provided by commissions is insufficiently 
trained and there are lots of situations in which they have been hiring friends 
and acquaintances rather than experts in their domains… Additionally, the 
MPs in the committees are absentees in the debates. There are three, four, 
five committees that are doing their jobs, while the rest of the MPs are voting 
according to the party lines. Ideally, the committees should allocate more time to 
debating different bills, amending, and correlating them with existing legislation. 
It happed several times that one article contradicted another law. This is also the 
responsibility of the civil servants; they have to manage such situations”.
In fact, the argument of the unbalanced level of expertise (the information 
asymmetry) between the Government and the MPs is a recurrent justification in 
explaining the governmental predominance2 (that undergoes a process of ”normali-
zation”). To this end, the MPs are mobilizing arguments from bureaucratic/techno-
cratic approaches mixed with elements from the party-representation paradigm, 
automatically downplaying their roles as primary legislators. The government’s 
ascendency in initiating bills is often explained in the following manner:
”It’s absolutely normal. In all the countries, the government has the main 
prerogatives in initiating bills because it disposes of knowledge and experts 
needed to draft different pieces of legislation.  It is the role of Parliament to 
provide a forum for debate, as the democratic deliberative body, to express the 
will of the people…”
”It is my understanding that it is quite normal that the share of parlia-
mentary bills (that became laws) to be inferior to the ones initiated by the 
govern ment. This happens for three main reasons… Firstly, it is the main 
role of the parlia mentary majority to support through votes the government 
1 Ibidem
2 David EPSTEIN, Sharyn O’HALLORAN, ”Asymmetric Information, Delegation; and the 
Structure of Policy Making”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, 1999, pp. 37-56.
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program (adopted by the Parliament). Secondly, between a MP or a group of 
MPs who are initiating a bill and the government, there is an imbalance clearly 
favoring the government. Its technical body has a superior capacity to assess 
the technical, financial and opportunity facets of an initiative. By comparison, 
an MP has at his disposal incomparably lower resources of expertise. The third 
issue concerns the reform process that Romanian society went through during 
the recent years. The main promoter of these processes was the Government. 
Surely, policy reforms are bound to the parliamentary majority support offered 
to the government in office”. 
Consequently, Romanian MPs seem to favor the governmental expertise 
in initiating bills, following a technocratic ideal reinterpreted, in this situation, 
in parliamentary keys. The MPs’ representative role no longer corresponds to a 
communication belt between constituency and the national arena (formalizing and 
translating the society problems into various legislative proposals). Contrariwise, 
the Parliament becomes the playground for political debates and party discipline. 
Within this framework, to legislate and thus to be in the service of the people becomes 
an issue related with the ability of the MPs to adjust the already made legislative 
arrangements and to correct ‘off the rails’ governmental proposals. The third meaning 
assigned to the political expressions of representation finds its way in the analysis 
of the lawmaking function. The MPs become guardians of the citizens’ demands. To 
legislate is first and foremost to substantially screen the governmental proposals and 
to refine them, exercising a veto player role1.
”Let’s not forget that the government is the expression of a parliamentary 
majority and the Parliament does not adopt the bills in their initial form. All the 
legislative proposals are amended. Romania makes no exception to this general 
rule. There are of course some parliamentary initiatives that are rejected, but this 
is another story.”
Nevertheless, not all the MPs are at peace with governmental predominance and 
the reduced scope of parliamentary representation. The crisis of parliamentarianism, 
particularly in what concerns governmental disloyal practices, is often recalled by 
the MPs. The governmental hijacking of the parliamentary bills or the practices of 
sidelining MP proposals are vehemently denounced by some representatives. The 
government often ignores the source of a bill or an amendment. It does not matter 
whether a parliamentarian is a member of the majority or the opposition. The executive 
usually issues negative opinions regarding the proposals, burying in effect all chances 
for a legislative proposal to become law. Following the government’s opinion, the 
committee majority will reject the bill, and based on that, in the plenary session, the MPs 
will vote against the initiative. According to these representatives, the paradoxical veto 
player role played by the executive [within the parliamentary committees] is completed 
by other slipslops. Surprisingly, after only few months, the government appropriates 
the overruled bills. In this manner, the high ratio of rejected parliamentary proposals 
1 Herbert DORING, ”Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda”, 
in IDEM (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, St Martin’s Press, New York, 
pp. 223-246/pp. 234, 236.
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is only partially due to the MPs’ inability to draft solid pieces of legislation. Their 
willingness to substantially stand for their constituents remains intact and reflected by 
their ”kidnapped” activity. Some of the MPs proposals are simply copy-pasted by the 
governmental representatives in order to win issue-ownership on particular domains, 
but the intention of the legislator is indirectly promoted into the legislation:
”It happens that the government takes over some initiatives, even formulates 
negative opinions concerning certain bills. In some cases they are arguing they 
intend to create a broader legislative framework on a precise issue. …It’s often 
the case of the governmental desire to clutch the initiative prerogative”.
”It’s a dishonest governmental practice often conducted by some junior 
ministers or high civil servants. ...There were situations in which MPs from the 
opposition side had very good initiatives. It follows the logics of the political 
competition that the government takes on a bill that at a later stage will become 
an electoral credential. However, the MPs from the parliamentary majority are 
oftentimes complaining that the government refuses in an unsubstantiated 
manner their own bills, only to promote them after a while as governmental 
emergency ordinances”. 
The major impact of the executive power in shaping the parliamentary agenda 
is not confined to such legislative initiatives. A similar interest was also raised by 
the emergency ordinances. Designed by the 1991 Constitution as decisions that 
the government undertakes in ”exceptional cases” with an immediate effect, these 
governmental acts still preserve a special status. The revised form of the 2003 
Constitution introduced more details regarding ratification deadlines and the 
normative domain within which emergency ordinances are allowed. However, 
similarly to the Italian case, these constitutional delegation practices ”granted the 
executive the benefit of spontaneous and autonomous law-making by substitution 
under a (of necessity often false) plea of necessity”, while ”the legislative and 
the judiciary were placed ex ante in a perpetual default position of inferiority”1. 
Consequently, Romanian post-communism is characterized by the misusage of this 
procedure, ranging from a rather marginal production of emergency ordinances 
to their ever-increasing presence on the public scene2. Despite a visible decline in 
the general number of these acts in recent times (during Emil Boc’s cabinet there 
were issued 378 [2008-2012] emergency ordinances), the government continued to 
challenge in this manner all the mechanisms presupposed by a genuine process of 
deliberation, impeding the articulation of representational mechanisms. Fully aware 
of this limitation, the MPs concede that:
”The power to legislate is very fragile. A government that leads based on 
emergency ordinances captures much of the legislative function. The tragedy 
1 Bogdan IANCU, Legislative Delegation…cit., p. 253.
2 Until 1996 the emergency ordinances were exceptional documents (eg during office 
Nicolae Văcăroiu (1992-1996) 16 emergency ordinances were issued). Already in 1999 their 
number increased reaching 296 per year (Mugur Isărescu’s government (1999-2000). In 2000-
2004 the government formulated 692 such ordinances while in 2005-2008 the cabinet issued 726 
new regulations through the same mechanism. See Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, 
partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 39.
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in Romania is that the emergency ordinances produce effects as soon as the 
government issues them. Basically, in 90% of cases, once the Government has 
issued them, the work of Parliament is a pure formality. There is a psychological 
blockage. They already produce effects. It would be foolish to start changing 
them. As a result, the Parliament is relegated to a purely decorative role”.
The MPs denounce the impossibility to exercise their mandates even in an ex post 
perspective. The multiplication of the emergency ordinances, often amending other 
similar regulatory acts, within a very short time-span, is limiting the Parliament’s 
legislative capacity. Nevertheless, these opinions are rather contradicted by empirical 
analyses. Aside from the decline in manufacturing legislation through this procedure, 
the significant growth in the number of emergency ordinances should be read cum 
grano salis. As Irina Ionescu notes, ”the Parliament exercises its veto power against 
half of emergency ordinances sent by the Government”1, sanctioning in this way the 
unidirectional manner of norm production. At the same time, if the importance of 
these regulations has often been cited given their direct impact in terms of public 
policies and their immediate implementation in national legislation, ordinances 
remain, in absolute terms, less present than bills initiated by the Government and 
play rather marginal functions when compared to the rates set by governmental 
decisions2. Within this framework, the prime justifications of the MPs regarding their 
ability to take action on the behalf of citizens relate to the fact that the adopted bills 
are usually reflecting the governmental program. The emergency ordinances’ salience 
”naturally” declines and they are often portrayed as an in-house production of the 
Romanian Parliament. 
Finally, the third category of rationales unveiled different MPs views on 
representation through the perspective of parliamentary activity. The parliamentary 
lawmaking function refers to the ability to regulate and not necessarily to the MPs’ 
capacity to promote new pieces of legislation. For these actors, the core value of 
parliamentary authority would aim mainly to the amendment of bills initiated by 
the executive. From this perspective, the MPs would preserve a certain form of 
parliamentary oversight on governmental activity, reinforced by their ability to 
revise governmental bills. Within this frame, parliamentary committees are described 
as melting pots for the views and opinions of MPs. There are numerous divergent 
opinions criticizing the work overload centered on the parliamentary committees, 
according to which, MPs often fail in fulfilling their mission as ”screening devices 
for governmental legislation”. They do so either by compliance to the governmental 
wishes, or simply due to lack of time. Some committees are highly predisposed to 
blockage such as Finance, Public Administration or Legal Committee. To realize the 
amount of workload required from the Legal Committee it suffices to mention that 
during the 2004-2008 mandate, the members of the Committee met in 134 sessions, 
they had to discuss 362 bills, 221 reports, 676 reviews and 311 memos. Consequently, in 
a session of up to five hours (according to the official schedule of the House) members 
1 Irina IONESCU, Le rôle du parlement dans la création des politiques publiques, Institutul 
European, Iaşi, 2011, p. 272.
2 The governmental production of different regulations is quite impressive. During the 1990-
2007, the Romanian governments drafted 1.874 emergency ordinances, 22.814 governmental 
decisions and no less than 4.969 bills that were adopted by the Parliament. For further details 
see Alexandra IONAŞCU, Les élites politiques…cit., p. 11.
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of this committee had to negotiate on average three bills, two reports, formulate five 
opinions, and discuss two memos, while debating 13 amendments. Similar numbers 
can be cited for recent periods. For instance, the same committee (in 2008-2012) had to 
debate 535 reports and to formulate 708 opinions1. It goes without saying that in this 
situation the time allotted for a thorough discussion on the procedures and proposals 
is insufficient. Parliament’s decision-making capacity is thus reduced not by the lack 
of activity, but by an overwhelming effect of agenda overload. 
”There are some committees that are practically overloaded. It is difficult to 
obey to the tight deadlines imposed by the Permanent Bureau. There is therefore 
not enough time to reflect on some bills. At the same time, the government 
adopted a style by leaps and bounds. Two or three months without any bill and 
then 20 or 30 legislative projects are sent to committees as a bulk.”
There are several observations that can be made with respect to this continuous 
quest for extensive regulatory frameworks. Even though there are objective reasons 
for the bills’ proliferation (following the adoption of the acquis communautaire and 
the intensification of international obligations)2, the agenda overcharge often hides 
parliamentary conflicts or a lack in the internal party coordination. In this way, the 
politicians of the opposition have tried several times to ”drown” the parliamentary 
activity through numerous amendments (this is especially true for the budget laws). 
At the same time, the lack of internal cooperation within and among parliamentary 
groups and the frequent defaulters describe a space dominated by the failure in 
reaching political consensus. Additionally, a first glance into the parliamentary drafted 
initiatives discloses the MP’s tendency to propose several bills on the same issue or 
a plurality of segmented bills concerning the amendment of one piece of legislation. 
Adopting competitive and non-collaborative tactics, the MPs are rather focused on 
delaying their own initiatives, even if they are members of the majority. This challenges 
the essence of parliamentary work that mutates the representation power game from 
a logic of ”lobbying for amendments” towards a combative principle that bears on the 
overall parliamentary agenda.
Legislative delegation towards the executive implies the growing process of 
the governmental control over the parliamentary agenda (in the creation of public 
policies)3. From agents of the constituency versus the agents of the party, the MPs become 
subjects of the government. However, before drawing a conclusion about the existence 
of defective processes of delegation and the absence of political accountability, the 
parliamentary function of oversight should also be investigated4. Does the Romanian 
1 IPP,”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012”, cit.
2 Similar processes have been depicted in other CEE countries. See Attila ÁGH, ”The 
EU Accession and ECE Parliaments: A Hungarian Approach”, German Policy Studies/
Politikfeldanalyse, vol. 1, no. 4, 2001, pp. 419-433.
3 George TSEBELIS, Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work, Russel Sage Foundation, 
New York, 2002, p. 14.
4 There are two main mechanisms for containing agency losses: ex ante (contract design 
and screening &selection) and ex post accountability (referring to monitoring, reporting and 
institutional checks). In a parliamentary system the contract design refers to the vote of 
confidence in a new government, the recruitment process refers to the criteria of selection such 
as the party seniority in appointing different leaders. The ex post mechanisms are either the 
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Parliament foster the oversight capacity that may finally balance the yet unchallenged 
rein of the party in government? From a formal perspective, despite the government 
predominance, Romanian Parliament is defined as a rather strong institution. 
Article 109 of the Constitution explicitly states that ”the Government is politically 
responsible for its entire activity only before Parliament”. In this regard, there are 
two forms of Parliamentary oversight1: the strong forms of control (conducive to the 
demise of government following a no confidence vote) or rather ”soft” formulas of 
oversight. The first type of oversight regards: (1) the Prime minister designation and 
the confidence vote for the Government and (2) the ability to dismiss the Government 
following a censure motion. Both of these two instruments have been put to the test 
during recent years. Nevertheless, they remained rather without acknowledgeable 
outcomes on the political scene. Minority governments were recurrently supported 
in Parliament. Likewise, the motion of censure has been frequently mobilized on the 
Romanian political scene. Six motions were introduced in 2004-2008, while 11 others 
were tabled in the following term. Surprisingly, for the first time in the course of 
Romanian post-communism, two of these powerful tools of parliamentary oversight 
were adopted. Nevertheless, due to the political power configurations and contextual 
factors it was only the last of these motions, initiated on the 18th of April 2012, that was 
conducive to a Cabinet overthrow. The Parliament exercised its veto power against the 
executive by expressing its lack of confidence in the governmental team (nevertheless, 
it is to be mentioned that this also happened in the case of a political unaffiliated Prime 
minister). Consequently, even though the political system disposes of formal rules of 
investiture2 and less restrictive regulations leading to the fall of governments3, from a 
parliamentary perspective these institutional mechanisms exhibit rather the blackmail 
potential of the partisan actors, without systematically determining effective political 
outcomes.
While the first type of parliamentary oversight is meant to sanction governmental 
malpractices, the soft mechanisms for screening the governmental activity, without 
an immediate sanction (parliamentary questions, interpellations and motions for the 
agenda), revolve around the idea that the Government should periodically inform the 
Parliament of the manner in which it performs its program (art 111, 2003). As compared 
to the ex-ante monitoring mechanisms for governmental accountably (mainly a party 
organization attribute) often referring to the equilibrium between members of the 
party coalition in government, these forms of parliamentary oversight concern the 
information shortcuts and agency problems encountered by both the majority and the 
opposition members. If the opposition parties can instrumentalize these procedures 
institutional forms of internal parliamentary oversight (such as the parliamentary questions 
or interpellations) or the external form of control on the executive branch. For further details 
see D.R. KIEWIET, M.D. MCCUBBINS, The Logic of Delegation: Congressionnal Parties and the 
Appropriation Process, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1991, p. 27. 
1 Yves MÉNY, Yves SUREL, ”Les Parlements”, in IDEM, Politique comparée: les démocraties 
Allemagne, États-Unis, France, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, 7 ed., EJA, Montchrestien, Paris, 2004, 
pp. 235-292.
2 I. BERGMAN, ”Formation Rules and Minority Governments”, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 23, 1993, pp. 55-66/p. 57.
3 Given the fact that a simple vote for a motion of censure can lead to the demise of 
government. V. Lieven DE WINTER, ”The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and 
Resignation”, in Herbert DORING (ed.), Parliaments…cit., pp. 115-151/p. 135.
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in order to gather1 information that can lead to a censure motion, the members of 
the governmental coalition tend to employ these forms of parliamentary surveillance 
for the purpose of screening the activities of different ministries allotted to the other 
coalition partners2. Designed in order to accommodate both the political coalitions 
necessities’ and the executive-legislative relations, these procedures are however 
directly dependent on the individual MPs’ capacity to act on the parliamentary arena. 
Ex-post forms of monitoring the governmental actions3, the parliamentary questions 
and interpellations are often cited by the MPs as substitutes for their failing lawmaking 
attributes. Consequently, the MPs distort the notion of substantive representation by 
focusing rather on parliamentary oversight:
”The legislative function is only one parliamentary role amongst many 
others. There is of course the parliamentary oversight and other marginal attri-
butes such as supervising the autonomous agencies’ activities or the suspension 
of the President. But parliamentary oversight is a function of great importance, 
because it facilitates the transformation of hidden information into public 
knowledge”.
Indeed, the changes in the MPs’ lawmaking role and its replacement with 
different forms of parliamentary oversight are important parts in the puzzle of the 
political regime functioning. The essence of the delegation within the parliamentary 
representation paradigm particularly implies the creation of strong linkages of delegation 
and accountability evincing both procedural and substantial connotations: the MPs 
are accountable in front of their voters, whereas the government (although it controls 
the public policy agenda) is in turn accountable to viable parliamentary mechanisms 
of control4. The censure motion adoption and a close scrutiny of the parliamentary 
activity in this regard suggest the tendency towards strong formulas of parliamentary 
oversight. For instance, in 1997 there were 951 questions and 987 interpellations, 
while in 2005 their number increased to 951 questions and 987 interpellations5. The 
proliferation of these practices reached its apex during the last legislature. No less 
than 11.597 questions and 6.331interpellations6 were formulated over the span of 
only four years (which means in average 3.000 questions and 1.600 interpellation per 
year). The exponential multiplication of questions and interpellations can express the 
MPs’ basic needs of being informed on a wide range of policies. At the same time, 
due to the growing transparency of parliamentary activity, these instruments may 
also provide more visible profiles for the individual parliamentarians. The elected 
1 Matti WIBERG, ”Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communication?”, in ibidem, 
p. 186.
2 Lanny W. MARTIN, ”The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies”, American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 48, no. 3, 2004, pp. 445-461/p. 458.
3 Thomas SAALFELD, ”Members of the Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: 
Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, 
2000, pp 353-376/p. 357.
4 Arthur LUPIA, Mathew MCCUBBINS, ”Representation or Abdication? How Citizens 
Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed ?”¸ European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, 
2000, pp. 291-307/p. 304.
5 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiţi…cit., p. 305.
6 IPP,”Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012”, cit.
254
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 2 • 2013
ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU
representatives became thus ”loudspeakers” for their constituents, representing 
their voices, and demanding replies from the government. In this way, the agency 
problems that impact greatly on the governmental accountability in front of the MPs 
[and citizens] could be partially fettered1. It appears however that the MPs recently 
used these mechanisms rather as a method of retaliation against the government. 
In practice, it is quasi-impossible for the ministers to be present or to respond in a 
substantial manner to the MPs claims. Paradoxically, similarly to parliamentary 
committees, it is the governmental representatives’ encumbrance that actually lessens 
the force of these forms of oversight. The shallowness of these procedures is perceived 
by the MPs: 
”The MPs have to win over the citizens’ confidence. Surely the MPs do stand 
for the citizens, nevertheless to reach 12% level of public trust in Parliament…This 
is largely the result of the fact that not only the legislative function is disregarded 
by the MPs but the oversight function as well. Controlling the executive is 
an extremely weak parliamentary function in Romania. The parliamentary 
questions and interpellations should be the most important part of our activity, 
but unfortunately they are more and more formal procedures. Real debates 
around an interpellation are not organized. You can also infer this from the 
governmental representatives that show up in order to provide answers. There 
are situations in which the Prime minister or the ministers are present in order to 
respond to these inquiries, nevertheless in most of the cases they send instead a 
junior minister that has no clue about the topics addressed”.
Exceedingly cumbersome legislative processes, the extensive usage of emergency 
ordinances, and the impossibility to articulate viable forms of parliamentary 
oversight are some of the main features of the MPs’ activities. Within this frame, 
the very nature of political representation is difficult to grasp. The MPs abide by the 
traditional perceptions of the parliamentary representation, denouncing at the same 
time the impetuous competition characterizing the executive-legislative relations. 
The committee work as genuine laboratory of representation is in a gridlock, the 
parliamentary bills are either insufficiently articulated or they are captured by the 
government. Although constitutional arrangements and institutional regulations are 
partially to blame for the continuous recourse to governmental legislation2, the myriad 
of defective parliamentary roles on the national arena raises the question of a proper 
meaning that can be assigned to parliamentary mandates. Far from corresponding 
to the ideal of burkean trustees in the service of the people, the MPs are confined to 
follow the party rules, or contrary to this, to use their personal networks in order to 
bargain for their immediate and factional interests. If the parliamentary delegation 
towards the executive does not necessarily entail the end of political representation 
in the parliamentary arena, the defective articulation of the executive-legislative 
1 Stephan HAGGARD, Marthew D. MCCUBBINS, ”Introduction, Political Institutions and 
the Determinants of Public Policy”, in IDEM (eds.), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 1-27.
2 Bogdan IANCU, ”Antinomii constituţionale. O introducere”, in Gabriel ANDREESCU, 
Miklos BAKK, Lucian BOJIN, Valentin CONSTANTIN, Comentarii la Constituţia României, 
Polirom, Iaşi, 2010, pp. 11-12.
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relations (in the absence of accountability)1, and the incapability of the MPs in 
exercising their mandates erode all representational free mandate residues, producing 
a delegative democracy2. Within this framework, the MPs do not become servants of the 
people or at least, servants of the parties, following the previously defined patterns of 
representation, but they are rather subjects of government (easily ostracized once they 
declare their autonomous statute).
The Mismatch:
What Type of political Representation?
With the symbolic facet of political representation constantly declining and 
within undefined institutional frameworks, the meanings of political representation 
are confined to a substantial definition framed by the MPs’ behaviors and 
understandings of their mandates. Resultant of individual actors’ activities deployed 
both locally and on national arena, the political representation process unveils a 
composite and contradictory nature. Embracing a party democracy model, the MPs 
define their mandates as instruments in the service of parties. Nevertheless, their 
unreliable behaviors testify of fierce battles for more personal autonomy. Bound to 
obey the party directives on the national arena, they are confronted with a double 
choice: exit or blind loyalty (mechanical voting). The party discipline in passing bills 
and the parliamentary procedures restraining the MPs’ ability to take the floor or to 
become visible political actors leave little room for a free mandate. The incessant flow 
of parliamentary defections and their numerous truancies in plenary or committee 
sessions are often ways to retaliate against the party organizations. However, if these 
strategies can produce short-term benefits in the eye of the electorate or in the media 
realm, the MPs have no chance in fighting both the party and the governmental 
command. 
The weapons of parliamentary oversight became in this way useless tools in taming 
the actions of the party (or coalition) in government. Their rapid multiplication hinders 
the prodigious and unaccounted executive activities, but at the same time, undermines 
the impact of such control levers, transforming them into formal procedures, lacking 
in any substance. If, for the first time in the course of Romanian post-communism, 
these forms of parliamentary control have succeeded to overthrow the government, 
the event marked less the emergence of empowered MPs on the national arena, 
as it only reiterated the importance of party switching and thus unreliable forms 
of conduct in the parliamentary games. In and of itself, the downfall of the party 
1 Kaare STRØM, Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Torbjörn BERGMAN (eds.), Delegation and 
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 257; Kaare 
STRØM, ”Democracy: Accountability and Coalition Bargaining”, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 31, 1997, pp. 47-62/p. 48.
2 Designating a form of democracy, other than representative democracy, ”delegative demo-
cracy” includes the presence of mechanisms to ensure vertical accountability (free elections). 
However, the delegative democracy refers to malfunctions on the horizontal mechanisms of 
accountability. See Guillermo O’DONNELL, ”Delegative Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 5, no. 1, 1994, pp. 55-69/p. 59. See also Guillermo O’DONNELL, ”Horizontal Accountability 
in New Democracies”, in Andreas SCHEDLER, Larry DIAMOND, Marc F. PLATTNER (eds.), 
The Self-Restraining State, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1999.
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democracy model does not give rise to new forms of representation (or entails the 
return to the parliamentary ideals). The parliamentary initiatives (regardless of their 
authors) are either systematically hijacked or blocked by government opinions. In 
some cases, the MPs’ failures to legislate are also reflecting their lack of know-how 
in codifying their constituents’ demands. The mixture of central party dependence 
along with the MPs momentary declarations of independence (inspired primarily 
by a free-rider electoral dilemma) describes a limited space for parliamentary action 
and political representation. Within this frame, the MPs’ preferences for constituency 
representation appear like a breath of fresh air after endless power disputes. Strong 
supporters of their constituency roles, the MPs are however rapidly fatigued by the 
futility of their endeavors. In fact, their local ties can only matter within a bureaucratic 
interpretation of their mandates, as the MPs do not possess any leverage in attributing 
a deeper meaning to their actions at the grassroots level. It is not only that the MPs do 
not resemble to their electorates, but they are also unable to take effective actions or 
to serve the best interests of their constituents in a non-mediated way. 
The analysis of political representation in the Romanian case is described primarily 
by a bulk of mismatches. The contradictory MPs’ claims concerning their effective 
roles, the strenuous and sometimes antithetical party behavior, and the unaccountable 
governmental capture of the parliamentary activity are all valid reasons for the well-
founded citizens’ lack of trust in the parliamentary institution. Hence, it appears that 
Romanian MPs are neither in the service of the people, nor are they party servants or 
(even less) local leaders. They appear rather, in their own descriptions, as quiet political 
bystanders. Paradoxically, the only window of opportunity for the MPs’ to share their 
viewpoints is to be found in the ethereal and controversial media space. Nevertheless, 
even in this well-forgotten corner of parliamentary freedom of action, new boundaries 
tend to emerge.
